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Abstract
This paper examines the informational eﬃciency of loans relative to bonds sur-
rounding loan default dates and bond default dates. We examine this issue using a
unique dataset of daily secondary market prices of loans over the 11/1999-06/2002
period. We ﬁnd evidence consistent with a monitoring role of loans. Speciﬁcally, con-
sistent with a view that the monitoring role of loans should be reﬂected in more precise
expectations embedded in loan prices, we ﬁnd that the price decline of loans is less ad-
verse than that of bonds of the same borrower around loan and bond default dates.
Additionally, we ﬁnd evidence that the diﬀerence in price decline of loans versus bonds
is ampliﬁed around loan default dates that are not preceded by a bond default date of
the same company. Our results are robust to several alternative explanations, and to
controlling for security-speciﬁc characteristics, such as seniority, collateral, covenants,
and for multiple measures of cumulative abnormal returns. Overall, we ﬁnd that the
loan market is informationally more eﬃcient than the bond market around loan default
dates and bond default dates.
JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: G14, G21, G22, G23, G24
Key Words: monitoring, default, spillovers, event study, loans, bonds, stocks
1. Introduction
The monitoring role of bank lending has been well documented in the literature. Sev-
eral theoretical models highlight the unique monitoring function of banks (e.g., Diamond,
1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Fama, 1985). These studies generally argue that
banks have a comparative cost advantage in monitoring loan agreements. For example, Dia-
mond (1984) contends that banks have scale economies and comparative cost advantages in
information production that enable them to undertake superior debt-related monitoring. Ra-
makrishnan and Thakor (1984) show that banks as information brokers can improve welfare
by minimizing the costs of information production and moral hazard. Fama (1985) argues
that banks, as insiders, have superior information due to their access to inside information
whereas outside (public) debt holders must rely mostly on publicly available information.
Several empirical studies also provide evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans, e.g., James
(1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), and Billett, Flannery and Garﬁnkel (1995).1
It may be noted that the incentives to monitor are likely to be preserved even in the
presence of loan sales in the secondary market.2 First, the lead bank, which typically holds
the largest share of a syndicated loan (see Kroszner and Strahan (2001)) rarely sells its share
of a loan. Conversations with industry experts suggest that there are at least two reasons for
this: (a) to preserve its banking relationship with the borrower, and (b) the lead bank is also
typically the administrative agent, and has a ﬁduciary responsibility to the rest of the banks
and investors to provide timely information on the borrower. Second, not all participants
in a loan syndicate sell their share of a loan, and therefore continue to have incentives to
1These studies examine the issue of whether bank lenders provide valuable information about borrowers.
For example, James (1987) documents that the announcement of a bank credit agreement conveys positive
news to the stock market about the borrowing ﬁrm’s credit worthiness. Extending James’ work, Lummer
and McConnell (1989), show that only ﬁrms renewing a bank credit agreement have a signiﬁcantly positive
announcement period stock excess return. Billet, Flannery, and Garﬁnkel (1995) show that the impact of
loan announcements is positively related to the quality of the lender.
2Possible reasons for loan sales include a bank’s desire to mitigate “regulatory taxes” such as capital
requirements (see, e.g., Pennacchi (1988)), to reduce the underinvestment problem of loans (see, e.g., James
(1988)), and to enhance origination and distribution abilities of banks (practitioners’ viewpoint). The only
study that empirically examines the impact of a loan sale on the borrower and on the selling bank is Dahiya,
Puri, and Saunders (2003), who ﬁnd, on average, that while the stock returns of borrowers are signiﬁcantly
negatively impacted, the stock returns of the selling banks are not signiﬁcantly impacted surrounding the
announcement of a loan sale.
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monitor. For example, commercial banks in a syndicate are typically known to adopt a buy
and hold (till maturity) strategy. Finally, the changing role of banks, from loan originators
to loan dealers and traders, which facilitated the development of a secondary market for
loans (See Taylor and Yang (2003)), may provide additional channels of monitoring. For
example, a bank who serves as a loan dealer will have incentives to monitor loans that are in
its inventory. Consequently, the monitoring role of loans has important implications for the
informational eﬃciency of the loan market versus the bond market. That is, as skilled loan
monitors with incentives to monitor, so called delegated monitors, banks collect information
on a frequent basis, and should be able to reﬂect such information in the secondary market
loan prices in a timely manner. Hence, the surprise or unexpected component of an event,
such as a default is likely to be smaller for banks than for bond investors because banks are
continuous monitors as compared to investors in the bond markets where monitoring tends
to be more diﬀuse and subject to free rider problems.3
The informational eﬃciency of the bond market relative to the stock market has received
increasing attention. For example, using a dataset based on daily and hourly transactions
for 55 high-yield bonds on the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) electronic
ﬁxed income pricing system (FIPS) between January 3, 1995 and October 1, 1995, Hotchkiss
and Ronen (2002) ﬁnd that the informational eﬃciency of corporate bond prices is similar to
that of the underlying stocks. Speciﬁcally, they document that the information in earnings
news is quickly incorporated into both bond and stock prices, even on an intraday level.
3We view that loan investors, such as banks, have the skills and the incentives to act as continuous
monitors as compared to investors in the bond markets where monitoring tends to be more diﬀuse and
subject to free rider problems. Data from the Dealscan database of the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC)
shows that a loan syndicate averaged 6.3 lenders per deal during 2002, and the average deal size was $356
million. The comparable numbers for bond issue syndicates from the Global New Issues database of the
Securities Data Company (SDC) during the same period were 5.22 lenders per bond syndicate, and the
average bond issue was $251 million. Assuming a linear relationship between the average issue size and
the size of the syndicate, one would expect 7.4 lenders for an equivalent bond issue of average size of $356
million (i.e., 5.22*356/251) − the size of the loan syndicate at 6.3 lenders is slightly lower than the expected
7.4 lenders. More importantly, based on reasons described earlier (e.g., preserving a banking relationship),
a lender in a loan syndicate is more likely to hold its share of a loan than distribute it as compared to a
lender in a bond syndicate, which suggests that the number of investors that typically hold a bond issue at
any particular point in time is likely to be larger than that of a loan issue, resulting in diﬀused monitoring
by the bond investors due to free-rider problems. Conversations with industry experts also conﬁrm our
understanding of the monitoring incentives in the loan market as compared to the bond market.
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Other studies have found a strong contemporaneous relationship between corporate bond
returns and stock returns.4
There is also a growing literature that indirectly contributes to the informational eﬃ-
ciency debate by examining institutional bond trading costs. Using a large dataset of corpo-
rate bond trades of institutional investors from 1995 to 1997, Schultz (2001) documents that
the average round-trip trading costs of investment grade bonds is $0.27 per $100 of par value.
Schultz also ﬁnds that large trades cost less, large dealers charge less than small dealers, and
active institutions pay less than inactive institutions. Interestingly, Schultz ﬁnds that bond
ratings have little eﬀect on trading costs.5
However, there is no study to date that examines the informational eﬃciency of the
secondary market for loans relative to the market for bonds of the same corporation, largely
due to unavailability (at least until now) of secondary market prices of loans. The market
for loans includes two broad categories, the ﬁrst is the primary or syndicated loan market, in
which portions of a loan are placed with a number of banks, often in conjunction with, and
as part of, the loan origination process (usually referred to as the sale of participations). The
second category is the seasoned or secondary loan sales market in which a bank subsequently
sells an existing loan (or part of a loan). In addition, the secondary loan sales market
is sometimes segmented based on the type of investors involved on the “buy-side”, e.g.,
institutional loan market versus retail loan market. A ﬁnal way of stratifying loan trades
in the secondary market is to distinguish between the “par” loans (loans selling at 90%
or more of face value) versus “distressed” loans (loans selling at below 90% of face value).
Figure 1 shows the rate of growth in the secondary market for loans, stratiﬁed by this last
categorization from 1991-2002. Note the growth in the market up to 2000 when the level of
secondary loan transactions topped $100 billion for the ﬁrst time. Note also the increasing
proportion of distressed loan sales reached 42% in 2002.
Our study focuses on the informational eﬃciency of the loan market relative to the bond
4See, for example, Blume et al (1991), and Kwan (1996) for details.
5In a related study, Hong and Warga (2000) employ a sample of 1,973 buy and sell trades for the same
bond on the same day and estimate an eﬀective spread of $0.13 for investment-grade bonds and $0.19 for
non-investment grade bonds per $100 par value.
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market around default dates, using a unique dataset of secondary market daily prices of
loans. Our sample period covers more than two years, namely November 1, 1999 through
June 30, 2002, a time of increasing level of corporate defaults.6
We hypothesize and test the following implication of a monitoring role of loans: Since
loans are likely to have timely and superior expectations built into their prices relative to
bonds because banks have the incentives and skills to act as continuous monitors as compared
to investors in the bond markets where monitoring tends to be more diﬀuse and subject
to free rider problems (see footnote 3 for details), this implies the unexpected (or surprise)
component of a default event is likely to be lower for loans than for bonds. Consequently, one
would expect the price reactions of loans to be signiﬁcantly lower than that of bonds around
both loan and bond default dates, controlling for diﬀerent attributes, such as, maturity, size,
seniority, collateral, and covenants of both instruments.7
Speciﬁcally, we pursue the following objectives: First, we examine return correlations
of loans and bonds around loan and bond default dates as a ﬁrst step to understanding
whether loans have a monitoring advantage over bonds. Second, we empirically test the
above mentioned hypothesis on the return performance of loans versus bonds around loan
and bond default dates. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst study to examine
these issues using secondary market loan price data.
In addition to contributing to the literature on informational eﬃciency of ﬁnancial mar-
kets, our study also contributes to the empirical literature on the monitoring role of loans.
In this paper, we present a direct test of the monitoring hypothesis. This is in contrast to
previous studies that tested the monitoring role of loans indirectly by examining the stock
price reaction (rather than the loan price reaction) of a borrower to the announcement of a
6According to Standard & Poors, corporate defaults set a record in 2002, for the fourth consecutive year.
The 234 companies and $178 billion of debt that defaulted during 2002 was the largest number and amount
ever, exceeding the previous records of 220 companies and $119 billion in 2001. In 2000 there were 132
companies and $44 billion as compared to 107 companies and $40 billion in 1999. See Brady, Vazza and Bos
(2003) for a historical summary of corporate defaults since 1980.
7The relevance of collateral in debt ﬁnancing has been well-established in the literature. For example,
Berger and Udell (1990) document that collateral plays an important role in more than two-thirds of com-
mercial and industrial loans in the United States. John, Lynch, and Puri (2003) study how collateral aﬀects
bond yields.
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new loan or the renewal of an existing loan to a borrower since they did not have access to
secondary market loan price data.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: First, while a small positive correlation
exists between daily bond returns and loan returns, it is considerably higher during a 21 day
event window [-10,+10], day 0 being the default date, as compared to other times in our
sample. This ﬁnding is consistent with an increased importance of default risk premiums in
explaining loan and bond returns, as compared to other factors8, as we approach a default
date. Second, consistent with a view that the monitoring role of loans should reﬂect in more
precise expectations embedded in loan prices, e.g., the surprise or unexpected component
of a default is likely to be smaller for loan investors than for bond investors, we ﬁnd that
the price reaction of loans is less adverse than that of bonds around loan and bond default
dates. Third, where a loan default date is not preceded by a bond default date of the same
company, we ﬁnd that the diﬀerential in the price reaction of loans versus bonds is higher
around such a loan default date. Our results are robust to several alternative explanations
(e.g., recovery rates, and liquidity diﬀerences), to controlling for security-speciﬁc character-
istics, such as maturity, size, seniority, collateral, covenants, and for multiple measures of
cumulative abnormal returns around default dates. Overall, we ﬁnd that the loan market is
informationally more eﬃcient than the bond market around default dates. Finally, prelimi-
nary evidence suggests that our results also extend to stocks, allowing us to make a similar
assessment of the return performance of loans versus stocks.
The results of our paper have important implications in terms of the impact of defaults
on loans and bonds, the monitoring of loans versus bonds, the beneﬁts of loan monitoring for
other ﬁnancial markets (such as the bond market and the stock market), and on the beneﬁts
of including loans as an asset class in an investment portfolio along with bonds and stocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
sample selection. Section 3 presents the test hypothesis. Section 4 summarizes our empirical
8See Elton et al (2001) for an analysis of the determinants of corporate bond spreads (relative to Trea-
suries) who ﬁnd that in addition to the expected default loss, other factors, such as taxes and risk premiums
associated with Fama-French factors are important in determining corporate bond spreads.
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results and Section 5 concludes.
2. Data and sample selection
The sample period for our study is November 1, 1999 through June 30, 2002. Our choice
of the sample period was driven by data considerations, i.e., our empirical analysis requires
secondary market daily prices of loans, which was not available prior to November 1, 1999.
We use several diﬀerent data sources in this study. First, our loan price dataset is
from the Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) and Loan Pricing Corporation
(LPC) mark-to-market pricing service, supplied to over 100 institutions managing over $200
billion in bank loan assets.9 This unique dataset consists of daily bid and ask price quotes
aggregated across dealers. Each loan has a minimum of at least two dealer quotes and a
maximum of over 30 dealers, including all top loan broker-dealers.10 These price quotes
are obtained on a daily basis by LSTA in the late afternoon from the dealers and the price
quotes reﬂect the market events for the day. The items in this database include a unique
loan identiﬁcation number (LIN), name of the issuer (Company), type of loan, e.g., term
loan (facility), date of pricing (Pricing Date), average of bid quotes (Avg Bid), number of
bid quotes (Bid Quotes), average of second and third highest bid quote (High Bid Avg),
average of ask quotes (Avg Ask), number of ask quotes (Ask Quotes), average of second and
third lowest ask quotes (Low Ask Avg), and a type of classiﬁcation based on the number of
quotes received, e.g., Class II if 3 or more bid quotes. We have 543,526 loan-day observations
spanning 1,863 loans in our loan price dataset.
Second, the primary source for our bond price dataset is the Salomon (now Citigroup)
Yield Book. We extracted daily prices for all the companies for which we have loans in the
loan price dataset. We have 371,797 bond-day observations spanning 816 bonds. Third, for
9Since LSTA and LPC do not make a market in bank loans and are not directly or indirectly involved the
buying or selling of bank loans, the LSTA/LPC mark-to-market pricing service is expected to be independent
and objective.
10At the time we received the dataset from LSTA, there were 33 loan dealers providing quotes to the
LSTA/LPC mark-to-market pricing service.
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robustness, we also created another bond price dataset from Datastream for a subset of loans
with a bond default date or a loan default date (the primary focus of our study), containing
91,760 bond-day observations spanning 248 bonds.
Fourth, our loan default dataset consists of loan defaults from the institutional loan
market. We received these data from Portfolio Management Data (PMD), a business unit
of Standard & Poors which has been tracking loan defaults in the institutional loan market
since 1995.11
Fifth, the source for our bond defaults dataset is the “New York University (NYU)
Salomon Center’s Altman Bond Default Database”. It is a comprehensive dataset of domestic
corporate bond default dates starting from 1974.
Sixth, the sources for the loan, bond and stock index returns are the S&P/LSTA Lever-
aged Loan Index from the Standard & Poor’s, the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Interme-
diate Bond Index from the Datastream, and the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Value-weighted
Index from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP).
Finally, security-speciﬁc characteristics, such as seniority, collateral and covenants were
obtained from the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) for loans, the NYU Salomon Center’s
Altman Bond Default Database, and the Fixed Income Securities Database for bonds.
Due to an absence of a unique identiﬁer that ties all these datasets together, time and
care was spent in manually matching these datasets based on name of the company and
other identifying variables, e.g., date (See Appendix 1 for more details on how these datasets
were processed and combined).
3. Test hypothesis
In this section, we develop a test hypothesis pertaining to the informational eﬃciency
of the loan market as compared to that of the bond market surrounding loan default dates
and bond default dates. Our central premise is that loans have a monitoring advantage
11Portfolio Management Data, a unit of Standard & Poor’s has recently changed its name to “Standard
& Poor’s Leveraged Commentary & Data”.
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over bonds. Several theoretical models highlight the unique monitoring function of banks
(see, for example, Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Fama, 1985). These
studies generally argue that banks have a comparative cost advantage in monitoring loan
agreements which helps reduce the moral hazard costs of new debt ﬁnancing. For example,
Diamond (1984) contends that banks have scale economies and comparative cost advantages
in information production. Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) show that banks as informa-
tion brokers can improve welfare by minimizing the costs of information production and
moral hazard. Fama (1985) argues that banks, as insiders, have access to inside information
whereas outside (public) debt holders must rely mostly on publicly available information,
such as new bank loan agreements.12 Further, diﬀused public debt ownership and the as-
sociated free-rider problem diminish bondholders incentive to engage in costly information
production and monitoring. This results in higher agency costs relative to bank debt, which
is typically concentrated. Several empirical studies also provide evidence on the uniqueness
of bank loans (see, for example, James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), and Bil-
lett, Flannery and Garﬁnkel (1995)). James (1987) documents that the announcement of a
bank credit agreement conveys positive news to the stock market about the borrowing ﬁrm’s
credit worthiness. Extending James’ work, Lummer and McConnell (1989), show that only
ﬁrms renewing a bank credit agreement have a signiﬁcantly positive announcement period
stock excess return. Billet, Flannery, and Garﬁnkel (1995) show that the impact of loan
announcements is positively related to the quality of the lender.
We argue that the incentives to monitor are likely to be preserved even in the presence
of loan sales in the secondary market. First, the lead bank, which typically holds the largest
share of a syndicated loan rarely sells its share of a loan to preserve its relationship with the
borrower, and to fulﬁll the ﬁduciary responsibility (as the administrative agent) to provide
timely information on the borrower to other syndicate banks and investors. Second, not all
participants in a loan syndicate sell their share of a loan (e.g., commercial banks typically
adopt a buy and hold strategy), and therefore continue to have incentives to monitor. Fi-
12James (1987) ﬁnds evidence that support an informational role that links loan agreements to favorable
stock price reactions.
8
nally, the changing role of banks, from loan originators to loan dealers and traders, which
facilitated the development of a secondary market for loans, may provide additional channels
of monitoring (i.e., to monitor loans that are in its inventory). Consequently, the monitoring
role of loans has important implications for the informational eﬃciency of the loan market
versus the bond market. For example, loans are likely to have timely and superior expecta-
tions built into their prices because banks are continuous monitors as compared to investors
in the bond market where monitoring tends to be more diﬀuse and subject to free rider prob-
lems. Hence, the unexpected (or surprise) component of a loan default or a bond default is
likely to be lower for loans than for bonds.13 This leads to the following hypothesis:
Default expectation hypothesis: The unexpected (or surprise) component of a default
event is likely to be lower for loans relative to bonds.
Consistent with the default expectation hypothesis, we expect the price reaction of loans
to be signiﬁcantly lower than the price reaction of bonds around loan default dates and
bond default dates, after controlling for contractual or security-speciﬁc attributes, such as,
maturity, size, seniority and collateral, and covenants of both instruments.
4. Empirical results
We begin this section with an analysis of the return correlations of loans and bonds as
the ﬁrst step in understanding whether loans have a monitoring advantage over bonds. We
follow this analysis with the results from testing the default expectation hypothesis.
4.1. Return correlations of loans and bonds
Table 1 presents the average return correlation, and average t-statistic of loan-bond pairs
of the same company around loan and bond default dates. We compute a daily loan return
based on the mid-price quote of a loan, namely the average of the bid and ask price of a
13This assumes a partial spillover of the loan monitoring beneﬁts to bonds − if bonds realize the full
beneﬁt of loan monitoring, the information used in forming loan and bond prices is likely to be identical.
Whether the spillover is full or only partial is ﬁnally an empirical issue. Our results, discussed in Section 4
are consistent only with a partial spillover of the beneﬁt of loan monitoring from loans to bonds.
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loan in the loan price dataset.14 That is, a one day loan return is computed as today’s
mid-price divided by yesterday’s mid-price of a loan minus one. The daily bond returns
are computed based on the price of a bond in the Salomon Yield Book in an analogous
manner. A correlation coeﬃcient and a t-statistic (of whether a correlation coeﬃcient is
statistically diﬀerent from zero) is computed for each loan-bond pair of the same company
as long as we have at least ﬁve observations during the time period of interest.15 While the
return correlations are generally low − as we approach closer to a signiﬁcant event, such as a
default, a loan-bond pair shows a greater commonality or positive correlation in returns. For
example, the average return correlation between loan-bond pairs of the same company is 0.43
(average t-statistic on the correlations is 2.64, signiﬁcant at the 1% level) during the 21 day
event window surrounding a loan default date as compared to 0.12 (average t-statistic 1.97,
signiﬁcant at the 5% level) during the 234 day estimation window preceding the 21 day event
window. The corresponding loan-bond pair correlations around bond default dates are 0.15
during the 21 day event window as compared to 0.01 during the 234 day estimation window
− however, the average t-statistics on the correlations are not statistically signiﬁcant at any
meaningful level of signiﬁcance. This ﬁnding reﬂects the increasing importance of default
risk premiums in explaining loan and bond returns as compared to other factors (see footnote
8) as we approach a default date.
For robustness purposes, we also used daily bond returns from the Datastream instead
of the Salomon Yield Book. These correlations (not shown here) are similar to the ones in
Table 1. Hence for the remainder of the paper, we present our results using bond return
data from the Salomon Yield Book.
Correlations such as those presented in Table 1 provide useful information about the
commonality of returns.16 However, to understand the magnitude of the diﬀerence in return
14We calculate returns based on the mid-price, i.e., the quote mid point to abstract away from the bid-ask
bounce. See, for example, Stoll (2000) and Hasbrouck (1988) for more details.
15We test whether a speciﬁc correlation coeﬃcient is statistically diﬀerent from zero by comparing rxy
√
N−2√
1−r2xy
,
where rxy is the correlation coeﬃcient, N is the number of observations, with the critical value from a t-
distribution with N − 2 degrees of freedom at the desired level of signiﬁcance based on a two-tailed test. See
SAS Procedures Guide (Version 8) for more details.
16We ﬁnd that the price correlations (not reported in Table 1) also exhibit a similar pattern of an increase
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performance, one needs to examine the cumulative abnormal returns surrounding default
dates. We turn our attention to these measures in the following subsections.
4.2. Return performance around default dates
In this section, we empirically test the default expectation hypothesis. First, we present
univariate comparisons of cumulative abnormal returns of loan-bond pairs, matched based
on the name of the borrower. Next, we follow our univariate analysis with evidence from
multivariate tests where we simultaneously control for security speciﬁc characteristics, such
as maturity, issue size, seniority, and collateral of loans and bonds.
4.2.1. Univariate results
We conduct an event study analysis to examine the impact of corporate defaults on
secondary market loan prices and bond prices. We examine two types of default, namely
loan defaults, and bond defaults. We measure return performance surrounding default dates
by cumulating daily abnormal returns during a pre-speciﬁed window surrounding a default
date. We present empirical evidence for three diﬀerent event windows: 3-day window [-1,+1],
11-day window [-5,+5] and a 21-day window [-10,+10], where day 0 refers to the default date.
We use several diﬀerent methods to compute daily abnormal returns. First, on an un-
adjusted basis, i.e., using the raw returns, as a ﬁrst-approximation of the magnitude of the
return impact on a loan or a bond of the same corporation around default dates. Three
other return measures are also examined based on test methodologies described in Brown
and Warner (1985). Speciﬁcally and secondly, a mean-adjusted return, i.e., average daily
return during the 234 day estimation time period ([-244,-11]), is subtracted from a loan or
bond daily return. The third and fourth measures are based on a single-factor market index
in magnitude during the 21 day event window surrounding a default date. For example, the average price
correlation of a loan-bond pair of the same company is 0.82 (average t-statistic 11.30, signiﬁcant at the
1% level) during the 21 day event window surrounding a loan default date as compared to 0.57 (average
t-statistic 13.94, also signiﬁcant at the 1% level) during the 234 day estimation window preceding the 21 day
event window. The corresponding loan-bond pair correlations around bond default dates are 0.61 (average
t-statistic 5.39, signiﬁcant at the 1% level) during the 21 day event window as compared to 0.46 (average
t-statistic 9.97, also signiﬁcant at the 1% level) during the 234 day estimation window.
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(we use the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index as a market index for loans, and the Lehman
Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index as a market index for bonds).17 Thus, the
third measure is a market-adjusted return, i.e., the return on a market index is subtracted
from a loan or bond daily return and the fourth is a market-model adjusted return, i.e.,
the predicted return based on a market-model regression is subtracted from a loan or bond
return. We also used two diﬀerent types of multi-factor models for estimating abnormal
returns: (a) a three-factor model where the three factors are the return on a loan index, the
return on a bond index, and the return on a stock index, and (b) the three-factor model of
Fama and French (1993).18 The predicted return from a multi-factor model is subtracted
from a loan or bond daily return. More formally,
Ai,t = Ri,t − E[Ri,t], (1)
where Ai,t is the abnormal return, Ri,t is the observed arithmetic return,
19 and E[Ri,t] is
the expected return for security i at date t. The six diﬀerent methods of computing daily
abnormal returns correspond to six diﬀerent expressions for the expected return for security
i at date t. That is,
E[Ri,t] =


0 unadjusted
R¯i mean-adjusted
RMKT,t market-adjusted
αˆi + βˆiRMKT,t market-model adjusted
αˆi + βˆi,1RL,t + βˆi,2RB,t + βˆi,3RS,t three-factor model adjusted
αˆi + βˆi,1RS,t + βˆi,2RHML,t + βˆi,3RSMB,t three-factor model (Fama-French) adjusted
17While the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index is a daily series, the S&P/LSTA
Leveraged Loan Index is a weekly series during our sample period. For computing market-adjusted and
market-model adjusted daily abnormal returns of loans around default dates, we converted the S&P/LSTA
Leveraged Loan Index weekly series to a daily series through linear intrapolation.
18The returns on the Fama and French (1993) factors are obtained from Professor Kenneth French’s website
http://mba.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/.
19That is, Ri,t = Pi,t/Pi,t−1 − 1, where Pi,t and Pi,t−1 denote the price for security i at time t and t-1.
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where R¯i is the simple average of security i’s daily returns during the 234-day estimation
period (i.e., [-244,-11]):
R¯i =
1
234
t=−11∑
t=−244
Ri,t. (2)
RMKT,t is the return on a market index deﬁned as below:
RMKT,t =


RL,t loan index
RB,t bond index
RS,t stock index
where RL,t is the return on the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index, RB,t is the return
on the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index, RS,t is the return on
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted index, RHML,t is the return on a zero-investment
portfolio return based on book-to-market, and RSMB,t is the return on a zero-investment
portfolio return based on size for day t. The coeﬃcients αˆi and βˆi are Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) values from the market-model regression during the estimation time period.
That is, we regress security i’s returns on market index returns and a constant term to obtain
OLS estimates of αˆi and βˆi during the estimation time period.
20 The intercept and slope
coeﬃcients for the multi-factor models are deﬁned analogously to the single-factor models.
The test statistic under the null hypothesis (of zero abnormal returns) for any event day
and for multi-day windows surrounding default dates is described below.21 The test statistic
for any day t is the ratio of the average abnormal return to its standard error, estimated
from the time-series of average abnormal returns. More formally,
20Where we do not have return data for the full estimation period, to ensure that we have reasonable
estimates (e.g., lower standard errors), we require at least 50 observations to compute the mean-adjusted
and market-model adjusted abnormal returns. While the unadjusted and market-adjusted abnormal return
procedures do not need any minimum number of observations, we still employ the same criteria of requiring
at least 50 observations to ensure comparability of the diﬀerent abnormal return measures.
21Please see Brown and Warner (1985), pp. 7-8, and pp. 28-29 for more details.
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A¯t
Sˆ(A¯t)
∼ N(0, 1), (3)
where A¯t and Sˆ(A¯t) are deﬁned as
A¯t =
1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
Ai,t, (4)
Sˆ(A¯t) =
√√√√√ 1
233

 t=−11∑
t=−244
(A¯t − A∗)2

, (5)
where A∗ used in computing Sˆ(A¯t) is deﬁned as
A∗ =
1
234
t=−11∑
t=−244
A¯t, (6)
where Nt is the number of securities whose abnormal returns are available at day t. For tests
over multi-day intervals, e.g., [-5,+5], the test statistic is the ratio of the cumulative average
abnormal return (which we simply refer to as CAR) to its estimated standard error, and is
given by
t=+5∑
t=−5
A¯t
/√√√√t=+5∑
t=−5
Sˆ2(A¯t) ∼ N(0, 1). (7)
Table 2 presents the event study results for loan-bond pairs of the same company using
the market-model adjusted method. We ﬁnd evidence consistent with the default expectation
hypothesis described in Section 3.1, namely that loans decline in price by a smaller amount as
compared to bonds around default days. Speciﬁcally, loans fall by 19.51% during the 21 day
[-10,+10] window surrounding loan default dates, while bonds fall by 47.40%. The diﬀerence
in the loan average CAR (loan ACAR) and the bond average CAR (bond ACAR) of 27.89%
(i.e., -19.51%-(-47.40%)) is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (Z-stat 4.51).22 Similar
results are found surrounding bond default dates as well. That is, loans fall by 20.00% during
22The Z statistic for the diﬀerence in ACARs is based on a paired diﬀerence test of CARs of matched
loan-bond pairs.
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the 21 day window surrounding bond default dates, as compared to the 33.73% fall for bonds.
The diﬀerence in ACARs of 13.73% is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level (Z-stat 1.72).
Other event windows, namely 3 day [-1,+1] window, and 11 day [-5,+5] window surrounding
loan default days and bond default dates produce similar results.23 So, while ﬁrms typically
show signs of operating and ﬁnancial problems prior to default, there is signiﬁcant price
deterioration just prior to and just after the event date as evidenced in the larger event
window, e.g., 21 day window.
For robustness purposes, we also examined the event study results using the remaining ﬁve
measures: (a) unadjusted, (b) mean-adjusted, (c) market-adjusted, (d) Fama-French three-
factor model, and (e) a loan-bond-stock three-factor model (i.e., where the three factors are
the return on a loan index, the return on a bond index, and the return on a stock index)
adjusted CARs. The results, tabulated in Appendix 2 are qualitatively similar to those in
Table 2. Hence for the remainder of the paper, we present our event study results based on
market-model adjusted CARs.
In summary (so far), we ﬁnd support for the default expectation hypothesis. That is,
the price reaction of loans is less adverse as compared to that of bonds around loan default
dates and bond default dates. Our results are generally robust to the choice of event window
(i.e., 3-day, 11-day or 21-day event window), as well as the choice of the method of com-
puting abnormal returns (i.e., unadjusted, mean-adjusted, market-adjusted, market-model
adjusted, Fama-French three-factor model-adjusted, or a loan-bond-stock three-factor model
adjusted). However, the event study results have, so far, controlled only for the company
name, and not for security speciﬁc characteristics, such as maturity, issue size, seniority, and
collateral. We next turn our attention to these issues.
4.2.2. Multivariate results
For ease of interpretation of coeﬃcients in the regression analysis, we stack the loan-
bond pair observations, and deﬁne the dependent variable as simply the price decline, i.e.,
23The only exception is that the diﬀerence in ACARs for the 3 day window around bond default dates has
the predicted sign but is not statistically signiﬁcant.
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the negative cumulative abnormal return (NCAR), where NCAR=-CAR. For example, if the
CAR is -19.51% for a loan and -47.40% for a bond in a loan-bond pair, the dependent variable
NCAR takes a value of 19.51% for a loan observation, and 47.40% for a bond observation in
our regressions. Thus, a single loan-bond pair contributes to two observations in a stacked
regression. We focus on market-model adjusted NCAR during the 21-day event window, i.e.,
[-10,+10]. To measure the priority structure of loans and bonds, we incorporate the seniority
and collateral information of a loan or a bond, using the classiﬁcation of Altman and Kishore
(1996). We classify the loans and bonds into four diﬀerent categories (see Appendix 1 for
details) based on security-speciﬁc information from the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) for
loans, and the description of a bond in the bond default dataset, i.e., (a) Senior secured,
(b) Senior unsecured, (c) Senior subordinated, and (d) Subordinated and others.24 We
categorize these descriptive variables into three separate dummy variables corresponding
to: Senior secured, Senior unsecured, and Senior subordinated types.25 The independent
variables used in some or all of the OLS regressions are:
LOAN DUMMY: An indicator variable that takes a value of one for a loan, and zero other-
wise.
LOAN DEFAULT DUMMY: An indicator variable that takes a value of one if it is a loan
default, and zero otherwise.
LN(MATURITY): Stands for natural log of one plus remaining maturity (in years) as on a
default date.
LN(AMOUNT): Stands for natural log of one plus amount of the loan or bond issue (in $
millions).
SENIOR SECURED: An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a loan or a bond is
senior secured, and zero otherwise.
SENIOR UNSECURED: An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a loan or a bond
24We combine others, such as discount and junior subordinated categories (since there were relatively few
such loans and bonds) with the Subordinated into a single category.
25Since we include an intercept term in an OLS regression, we can only include three dummy variables (of
the four) to avoid the problem of linear dependence of the independent variables. Consequently, we drop the
dummy variable corresponding to “Subordinated and others”.
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is senior unsecured, and zero otherwise.
SENIOR SUBORDINATED: An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a loan or
bond is senior subordinated, and zero otherwise.
LOAN DUMMY x LOAN DEFAULT LEADS: An interactive indicator variable that takes
a value of one if it is a loan and if the loan default is not preceded by a bond default date of
the same loan-bond pair, and zero otherwise.
4.2.2.1. Discussion of the variables
We test the default expectation hypothesis described in Section 3.1 by examining the
predicted sign of the LOAN DUMMY coeﬃcient. We expect the LOAN DUMMY coeﬃcient
to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant, i.e., we expect a loan to have a smaller price
decline around a default date than that of a bond of the same company after adjusting for
the additional control variables described below.
We include the following variables as control variables: First, LOAN DEFAULT DUMMY,
an indicator variable for the type of default, namely whether it is a loan default or a bond
default. On one hand, as delegated monitors or “insiders”, banks are expected to be better
able to distinguish ex ante among good and bad borrowers relative to investors in the bond
markets where monitoring tends to be diﬀuse and subject to free rider problems. Strictly
interpreted, this implies that loan defaults should be rare events. Consequently, a loan de-
fault, when it does occur, is likely to be more surprising than a bond default, and may
reﬂect the potential loss of reputation of the bank (see Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan
(2003)). However, on the other hand, it can be argued that loan defaults are, by deﬁ-
nition, less surprising than bond defaults due to bank monitoring. Whether the LOAN
DEFAULT DUMMY will have a positive coeﬃcient or a negative coeﬃcient depends on
which of these two eﬀects dominate. Second, with respect to LN(MATURITY), we expect
this variable to have a positive coeﬃcient since longer-maturity debt issues are potentially
subject to a greater interest-rate risk exposure, and can have a higher default risk (Flannery,
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1986). In other words, we expect a larger price decline for longer-maturity issues.26 Third,
LN(AMOUNT). Larger issues, on one hand, are likely to be more liquid, associated with less
uncertainty, and have more public information associated with them. However, on the other
hand, larger issues may be more diﬃcult to reorganize post-default. Whether the sign of
the LN(AMOUNT) coeﬃcient is positive or negative is an empirical question as to which of
these two eﬀects dominates. Fourth, the priority structure reﬂects the protection or safety
cushion to a loan or bond holder in the event of default. For example, we expect the price
decline for a SENIOR SECURED security to be the least, followed by that of a SENIOR
UNSECURED security, which in turn is lower than that of a SENIOR SUBORDINATED
security. Accordingly, we expect the coeﬃcient of the SENIOR SECURED variable to be
smaller than that of the SENIOR UNSECURED variable, which in turn should be smaller
than that of the SENIOR SUBORDINATED variable. Finally, LOAN DUMMY x LOAN
DEFAULT LEADS, an interactive indicator variable that reﬂects the timing of a default date
and additionally serves as the ﬁrst signal of ﬁnancial distress.27 As a result, the measured
eﬀect of the LOAN DUMMY is expected to be ampliﬁed when a loan default is not preceded
by a bond default, i.e., we expect the interactive indicator variable to have a negative sign
similar to the LOAN DUMMY coeﬃcient.
4.2.2.2. Regression results
The multivariate regression results are presented in Tables 3-5. Table 3 presents the
regression results on loan default dates only. Table 4 presents the regression results on bond
default days only. Table 5 presents the results for loan and bond default days. The details
26It may be argued that conditional on default, a longer-maturity debt issue is less risky (than a shorter-
term debt issue) since it provides a longer period of time for a ﬁrm to revert to normalcy in terms of its cash
ﬂows. However, such an argument crucially misses incorporating the fact that the shorter-term debt of the
same borrower (including any new debt issued as part of a potential reorganization) enjoys time-seniority
over the longer-term debt, making the longer-term debt issue potentially more risky (and hence should be
associated with a larger price decline at default).
27Of the 74 loan-bond pairs in Table 2, 43 cases are when the loan default leads, 5 cases are when the
bond default leads, and the remaining 26 loan-bond pairs comprise simultaneous loan-bond defaults, i.e.,
loan and bond defaults within two days of each other. Since there are relatively few instances (ﬁve) where
a bond default leads, we did not include an additional interactive indicator variable due to concerns of
multicollinearity.
18
of these regressions are discussed below.
Speciﬁcally in Table 3, we test ﬁve diﬀerent speciﬁcations. We start with Model 1 where
we regress NCAR on LOAN DUMMY. The coeﬃcient on the LOAN DUMMY is negative
and statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that the price decline is 27.89% lower for loans as com-
pared to bonds.28 Next, we augment Model 1 with LN(MATURITY) and LN(AMOUNT) as
additional control variables to run the regression Model 2. The LOAN DUMMY continues to
be negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Next, we augment Model 1 with the indicator vari-
ables for the priority structure, namely SENIOR SECURED, SENIOR UNSECURED, and
SENIOR SUBORDINATED to run the regression Model 3. The LOAN DUMMY contin-
ues to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcients on the priority structure
variables have the correct sign and the correct relative magnitudes.29 We next augment
Model 3 with LN(MATURITY) and LN(AMOUNT) to run the regression Model 4. The
LOAN DUMMY continues to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, we augment
Model 4 with the LOAN DUMMY x LOAN DEFAULT LEADS indicator variable to run the
regression Model 5. Interestingly, both the LOAN DUMMY and LOAN DUMMY x LOAN
DEFAULT LEADS variables are each negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 4 presents the regression results around bond default dates only. The LOAN
DUMMY is negative in all ﬁve speciﬁcations, and statistically signiﬁcant in the last three
cases (Models 3-5). The LOAN DUMMY x LOAN DEFAULT LEADS has the expected sign
but is statistically insigniﬁcant around bond default days.
Finally, Table 5 combines the loan-bond pairs around loan default dates with the loan-
bond pairs around bond default dates. By combining, we augment each of the ﬁve regression
speciﬁcations in Tables 3 and 4 with a LOAN DEFAULT DUMMY variable. The LOAN
DUMMY is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in all ﬁve speciﬁcations which implies that
a loan has a smaller price decline around a default date than that of a bond of the same
company after controlling for other variables included in a regression speciﬁcation.
28This is exactly the diﬀerence in loan and bond ACARs from Table 2, i.e., -19.51 - (-47.40) = 27.89%.
29It may be noted that the coeﬃcients of SENIOR SECURED, SENIOR UNSECURED, and SENIOR
SUBORDINATED variables which are measured relative to “Subordinated and Others” can take values up
to -200% since the dependent variable, NCAR has a potential range of 200% (from -100% to +100%).
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Overall, based on the regression results, we ﬁnd evidence consistent with the default
expectation hypothesis described in Section 3. That is, we ﬁnd that the price reaction of
loans is less adverse than that of bonds around both loan and bond default dates − our
results are robust to controlling for security-speciﬁc characteristics, such as maturity, issue
size, seniority, and collateral. Additionally, the price decline is signiﬁcantly lower for loans as
compared to bonds around loan default dates that are not preceded by a bond default date.
We next test whether our results are robust to alternative explanations, such as recovery
rates, liquidity, covenants, timing of defaults, and lender forbearance.
4.3. Alternative explanations
In this section we test for several alternative explanations of our results in Section 4.2.
For the sake of brevity, we present evidence on whether diﬀerences in recovery rates, liq-
uidity and covenants between loans and bonds fully explain the price declines around loan
default dates.30 In addition, we also examine whether timing diﬀerences between loan and
bond defaults, or lender forbearance can explain away the diﬀerence in price decline of loans
versus bonds.
4.3.1. Recovery rates
If we take as given that loans recover more than bonds post-default (See Appendix 3 for
a historical tabulation of recovery rates by debt type and seniority from 1988-2Q 2003), this
may explain relative loan and bond price declines around a default date. In other words, a
loan price decline is smaller than a bond price decline around a default date simply because
loans recover more than bonds. However, a stronger test is to see if loan price declines
are less than bond price declines even after controlling for recoveries. We test for this by
examining whether adding the recovery rates (as proxied by the price of the loan or the bond
on the default date) to the ﬁnal regression speciﬁcation around loan default dates in Table
30The results are qualitatively similar for combined loan-bond pairs around default days (Table 5) and for
loan-bond pairs around bond default days (Table 4), albeit marginally less signiﬁcant in the latter case.
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3 (i.e., Model 5) changes the statistical signiﬁcance of the LOAN DUMMY coeﬃcient.31
The results are presented in Table 6 (see Model 1). We ﬁnd that the LOAN DUMMY
coeﬃcient continues to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant when we include the recovery
rate variables. This suggests that the price declines are not fully explained by the recovery
rates, and the monitoring advantage of loans over bonds is an important factor in determin-
ing price declines around default dates after controlling for recoveries.
4.3.2. Liquidity
To test whether diﬀerences in liquidity of loans versus bonds explain the relative loan and
bond price declines around a default date, we use two proxies for liquidity: First, issue size,
which we included in the multivariate regressions (see Section 4.2.2. for details). Second,
we use a scaled frequency of price changes of a loan (or a bond) as an additional proxy
for liquidity, namely the number of non-zero daily return observations as a fraction of the
number of daily return observations during the estimation period [-244,-11], further scaled
by the standard deviation of daily returns during the same period.32
The results are presented in Table 6 (see Model 2). We ﬁnd that the LOAN DUMMY
coeﬃcient continues to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant when we include proxies for
liquidity, such as issue size, and scaled frequency of price changes.33 This suggests that the
loan-bond price declines are not fully explained by diﬀerences in loan-bond liquidity, and
the monitoring advantage of loans over bonds is an important factor in determining price
31See Altman and Kishore (1996) and Altman (1993) for more details. Prices at or soon after default
are used in many default studies and reports, e.g., Altman (annually), Moody’s (annually), as well as in
the settlement process in the credit default swap market (usually 30 days after default). An alternative
measure for the recovery rate is the price at the end of the restructuring process, e.g., Chapter 11 emergence,
discounted back to the default date (See Altman and Eberhart (1994)). We have not used this measure since
many of the defaults in our study period have not been concluded and the data is not readily available even
when completed.
32This scaling allows for a consistent measurement of liquidity across securities of diﬀerential risk, where
risk is proxied by the standard deviation of daily returns. However, our results are not dependent on this
scaling. That is, the results are qualitatively similar (not reported here) if we use the frequency of price
changes instead of scaled frequency of price changes.
33It is interesting to note that the coeﬃcient estimates of both the liquidity proxies indicate that the price
decline around default dates is higher for loans and bonds that are more liquid relative to ones that are less
liquid, perhaps due to the relative ease in selling a more liquid security around default news.
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declines around default dates after controlling for liquidity diﬀerences of loans and bonds.
4.3.3. Covenants
To test whether diﬀerences in covenants of loans and bonds explain our results in Section
4.2.2, we construct a covenant score measure from a scale of 0 to 4 for each loan and
bond in our sample, and include it as an additional explanatory variable in a multivariate
regression. To construct this measure, we follow Smith and Warner (1979) to classify a
covenant into one of four categories: First, investment covenants, such as restrictions on
disposition of assets, and restrictions around a merger event in the future. Second, dividend
covenants, such as restrictions on dividends and other distributions to equity holders. Third,
ﬁnancing covenants, such as restrictions on issuance of debt or equity in the future. Finally,
payoﬀ covenants, i.e., provisions that modify the payoﬀs to security holders, such as sinking
funds, convertibility and callability provisions. The data sources we used for covenants is
the Dealscan database for loans and the Fixed Income Securities Database for bonds. We
consider both the explicit information (e.g., a restriction on issuance of future debt) and
implicit information (e.g., a leverage covenant due to which a ﬁrm cannot exceed a certain
leverage, implies a restriction on future debt ﬁnancing) in classifying covenants into the
four category types − both these covenants are classiﬁed as ﬁnancing covenants. We next
follow an approach similar to the one used by Bagnani et al (1994) of creating separate
dummy variables for whether a loan or a bond has at least one covenant in a category type.
Speciﬁcally, INVCOV = 1 for at least one investment covenant, DIVCOV = 1 for at least
one dividend covenant, FINCOV = 1 for at least one ﬁnancing covenant, and PAYCOV
= 1 for at least one covenant modifying the payoﬀ to investors. All dummy variables are
zero otherwise. COVENANT SCORE is deﬁned as the sum of these four dummy variables.
Consequently, COVENANT SCORE can take the lowest value of zero for a loan or a bond
that has no restrictive covenants in any of the four category types, and the highest value of
four for a loan or a bond that has all the four category types.
The results are presented in Table 6 (see Model 3). We ﬁnd that the LOAN DUMMY coef-
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ﬁcient continues to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant, and the coeﬃcient of COVENANT
SCORE is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. This suggests that the loan-bond price de-
clines are not fully explained by diﬀerences in loan-bond covenants, and the monitoring
advantage of loans over bonds is an important factor in determining price declines around
default dates.
4.3.4. Timing of defaults
To test whether our loan-bond price declines can be explained by the diﬀerence in timing
of a loan default and a bond default of the same borrower, we included an indicator variable
LOAN DUMMY x LOAN DEFAULT LEADS in the multivariate regression results in Section
4.2.2 (See, for example, Model 5 of Table 3).
The regression results are reproduced in Table 6 (see Model 4). We ﬁnd that the loan
dummy coeﬃcient is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, and that the loan-bond price
declines are only partially explained by the diﬀerences in loan-bond default dates of the same
borrower. Next, we augment this regression with the variables proxying for recovery rates,
liquidity, and covenants. The regression results, presented in Table 6 (see Model 5) show
that the LOAN DUMMY coeﬃcient continues to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant,
suggesting that the monitoring advantage of loans over bonds is an important factor in
determining price declines around default days, even after controlling for maturity, seniority,
collateral, recoveries, liquidity and covenant characteristics.
As an additional robustness test, we focus our attention on the 26 loan-bond pairs with
simultaneous loan-bond defaults. This subsample of 26 loan-bond pairs is not inﬂuenced
by any timing diﬀerences between loan and bond default days, and hence can be used as
an additional test of the monitoring role of loans over bonds. However given the small size
of this sample, we need to be cautious in the interpretation of the results. The univariate
results of the raw unadjusted returns (our ﬁrst measure of cumulative abnormal returns)
are shown in panel A of Table 7. We ﬁnd evidence consistent with the default expectation
hypothesis described in Section 3.1. That is, we ﬁnd that the LOAN ACAR is signiﬁcantly
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lower than the BOND ACAR for the [-5,+5] and [-10,+10] event windows. The results are
qualitatively similar with the market-model adjusted CARs (see panel B of Table 7), albeit
marginally weaker.
4.3.5. Lender forbearance
A loan may not be considered to be in default when a company misses a promised
payment but rather only after a certain grace period following a minimized payment during
which lenders may provide the borrower forbearance from making the promised payment.
In contrast a bond is considered to be in default as soon as the company misses a promised
payment (i.e., no grace period). This may bias the diﬀerential cumulative abnormal returns
of loans versus bonds around default dates. In other words, the cumulative abnormal return
of loans is smaller than that of bonds around default dates simply because the default dates
may be biased due to bank forbearance on delinquent loans. We test for this alternative
explanation by examining whether the cumulative abnormal return results change if we
expand the event window to include a possible forbearance period of 30-90 days − loans
that fail to accrue interest for more than 90 days are generally considered non-performing
assets.34
The results are presented in Table 8 (corresponding to Table 2) for three diﬀerent ex-
panded event windows to capture a possible forbearance period of one month, two months
or three months, i.e., for windows [-20,+10], [-40,+10] and [-60,+10], assuming each month
corresponds to approximately 20 business days based on an estimation window of [-244,-61].
We ﬁnd that the loan ACAR is smaller than bond ACAR in each of these cases where we
allow for a potential forbearance period of respectively one month, two months, and three
months.
4.4. Loans versus stocks
Previous empirical literature tests the monitoring role of loans by examining the stock
34The Federal Reserve usually treats a loan as non-performing if the borrower does not pay interest on
the loan for more than 30 days.
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price reaction of a borrower to the announcement of a new loan or a renewal of an existing
loan to a borrower. Such tests may be viewed as indirect tests of the monitoring role of
loans since direct tests would measure the price reaction of the loans rather than that of
the stocks. In this section, we propose a direct test (due to the availability of secondary
market loan price data) by examining the price reaction of loans as compared to that of
stocks around loan default days and bond default days. Speciﬁcally, we examine whether
our loan-bond results also extend to stocks, allowing us to make a similar assessment of the
return performance of loans and stocks. This will also allow us to benchmark our loan-bond
results.
Table 9 presents event study results for 29 loan-stock pairs around loan default dates and
59 stock-loan pairs around bond default days. This table includes matched loan-stock pairs
where we are able to compute the CAR based on the market-model adjusted method for the
[-10,+10] event window. That is, the return based on a market-model regression (using a
market index such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index for loans, or a value-weighted
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX index for stocks) is subtracted from the loan or stock daily return
respectively.
We ﬁnd evidence consistent with the default expectation hypothesis described in Section
3, namely that loan returns fall by a smaller amount as compared to stocks around default
days. In particular, loans fell by 4.87% during the 11 day [-5,+5] window surrounding loan
default dates, while stocks fell by 32.84%. The diﬀerence in the loan average CAR (loan
ACAR) and the stock average CAR (stock ACAR) of 27.97% (i.e., -4.87%-(-32.84%)) is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (Z-stat 2.94). Similar results are found surrounding bond
default dates as well. Speciﬁcally, loans fell by 4.30% during the 11 day window surrounding
bond default dates, as compared to the 25.39% fall for stocks. The diﬀerence in ACARs
of 21.09% is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (Z-stat 4.57). Other event windows,
namely 3 day [-1,+1] window, and 21 day [-10,+10] windows produce similar results with
the exception of the 21 day window around bond default dates (has the predicted sign but
is not statistically signiﬁcant).
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5. Conclusions
This paper examines the informational eﬃciency of loans relative to bonds surrounding
loan default dates and bond default dates using a unique dataset of daily secondary market
prices during 11/1999-06/2002. We ﬁnd that the return correlation between loans and bonds
is relatively low for the entire sample period but is considerably higher during a 21-day event
window surrounding a default date.
Consistent with a view that the surprise or unexpected component of a default is likely to
be smaller for banks than for bond investors because banks are continuous monitors whereas
monitoring in the bond market is more diﬀuse, we ﬁnd that the price reaction of loans is
less adverse than that of bonds around loan and bond default dates. Interestingly, where a
loan default date is not preceded a bond default date of the same company, we ﬁnd that the
diﬀerential in the price reaction of loans versus bonds is higher around such a loan default
date since it also acts as a ﬁrst signal of distress. Overall, we ﬁnd that the loan market
is informationally more eﬃcient than the bond market around default dates. Preliminary
evidence also suggests that our results extend to stocks.
The results of our paper have important implications in terms of the impact of defaults
on loans and bonds, the monitoring of loans versus bonds, the beneﬁts of loan monitoring for
other ﬁnancial markets (such as the bond market and the stock market), and on the beneﬁts
of including loans as an asset class in an investment portfolio along with bonds and stocks.
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TABLE 1
Average return correlations between loans and bonds around default dates
(matched by borrower name)
This table presents the average correlation and the average t-statistic (of testing whether the correlation
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero) between daily returns of loans and bonds of the same company
around default dates. The return data for loans is from the Loan Syndications and Trading Association
(LSTA) and the return data for bonds is from the Salomon Yield Book. The average correlations are
presented for the overall sample period and for several segments of time periods: (a) Pre-estimation period:
on or preceding day -245, (b) Estimation period: [-244,-11], which is further broken down into sub periods
as shown below, (c) Event window: [-10,+10], and (d) Post-event period: on or following day +11, where
day 0 refers to the loan default date in Panel A, and to the bond default date in Panel B. The superscripts
a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test.
Panel A: Loan default dates
Time Period Mean T-statistic
Pre-estimation period [≤-245] -0.00 -0.22
Estimation period [-244,-11] 0.12 1.97b
– Subsegment [-244,-121] 0.02 0.29
– Subsegment [-61,-120] 0.02 0.10
– Subsegment [-31,-60] 0.03 0.14
– Subsegment [-11,-30] 0.26 1.34
Event window [-10,+10] 0.43 2.64a
Post-event period [≥ +11] 0.02 0.34
Panel B: Bond default dates
Time Period Mean T-statistic
Pre-estimation period [≤-245] 0.01 0.01
Estimation period [-244,-11] 0.01 0.13
– Subsegment [-244,-121] 0.01 0.19
– Subsegment [-61,-120] -0.02 -0.25
– Subsegment [-31,-60] 0.03 0.24
– Subsegment [-11,-30] -0.00 -0.00
Event window [-10,+10] 0.15 0.93
Post-event period [≥ +11] 0.04 0.44
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TABLE 2
Average cumulative abnormal returns of matched loan-bond pairs around default dates
(matched by borrower name)
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of matched loan-bond pairs (based on
the name of the borrower) surrounding a default date (day 0), namely a loan default date or a bond default
date of the same company. This table includes matched loan-bond pairs where we are able to compute
the CAR based on the market-model adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event window. That is, the return
based on a market-model regression using a market index (such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index
for loans, or the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index for bonds) is subtracted from
the loan or bond daily return respectively. The Z statistics of ACARs (shown in parentheses) are computed
using the methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) that considers both the time-series and cross-sectional
dependence in returns. The Z statistics for the diﬀerence in ACARs are based on a paired diﬀerence test of
CARs of matched loan-bond pairs, and are shown in parentheses, where a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test.
Panel A: Loan default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -4.06 -20.92 16.86
(-4.48)a (-9.13)a (7.71)a
[-5,+5 ] -9.82 -38.16 28.34
(-5.67)a (-8.69)a (6.56)a
[-10,+10 ] -19.51 -47.40 27.89
(-8.15)a (-7.82)a (4.51)a
Obs 74 74
Panel B: Bond default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5)
[-1,+1 ] -3.37 -5.43 2.06
(-3.51)a (-2.09)b (0.83)
[-5,+5 ] -12.98 -28.84 15.86
(-7.07)a (-5.81)a (2.99)a
[-10,+10 ] -20.00 -33.73 13.73
(-7.88)a (-4.92)a (1.72)c
Obs 69 69
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TABLE 3
Linear regression of negative cumulative abnormal return around loan default dates
This table presents OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations determining the cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) performance of loans and bonds surrounding loan default dates. This table includes loans, and bonds
where we are able to compute the CAR based on the market-model adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event
window. The dependent variable NEGATIVE CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN, NCAR[-10,+10]
equals -CAR[-10,+10], where day [0] refers to a default date, namely the loan default date or the bond default
date of the same company. The CARs are computed based on market-model adjustment, i.e., the return
based on a market-model regression (using a market index such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index for
loans and the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index for bonds) is subtracted from the
loan or bond daily return. The independent variables are as follows: LOAN DUMMY takes a value of one if
it is a loan, and zero otherwise. LN(MATURITY) stands for natural log of one plus remaining maturity (in
years) as on a default date. LN(AMOUNT) stands for natural log of one plus amount of the loan or bond
issue (in $ millions). SENIOR SECURED, SENIOR UNSECURED, and SENIOR SUBORDINATED each
take a value of one if a loan or bond is classiﬁed like-wise and zero otherwise. LOAN DUMMY x LOAN
DEFAULT LEADS is an interactive dummy variable that takes a value of one if it is a loan and if the loan
default date is not preceded by a bond default date for the same loan-bond pair, and zero otherwise. The
t ratios shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) variance-covariance
matrix (a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test).
Dependent Variable: -CAR[-10,+10], Market-model adjusted (%)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
INTERCEPT 47.40 12.81 88.46 -14.23 -6.98
(6.65)a (0.48) (6.26)a (-0.58) (-0.26)
LOAN DUMMY -27.89 -17.28 -41.54 -34.53 -19.01
(-3.71)a (-2.88)a (−4.95)a (-5.26)a (-2.35)b
LN(MATURITY) 30.88 29.98 26.36
(3.83)a (4.95)a (4.21)a
LN(AMOUNT) -3.54 7.69 8.52
(-0.68) (2.18)b (2.38)b
SENIOR SECURED -100.58 -105.99 -111.62
(-6.33)a (-7.55)a (-7.97)a
SENIOR UNSECURED -38.60 -22.33 -23.22
(-4.22)a (-2.76)a (-2.82)a
SENIOR SUBORDINATED -22.27 -16.86 -24.16
(-1.71)c (-1.56) (-2.06)b
LOAN DUMMY x
LOAN DEFAULT LEADS -24.46
(-3.25)a
Observations 148 148 148 148 148
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.14 0.38 0.46 0.47
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TABLE 4
Linear regression of negative cumulative abnormal return around bond default dates
This table presents OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations determining the cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) performance of loans and bonds surrounding loan default dates. This table includes loans, and bonds
where we are able to compute the CAR based on the market-model adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event
window. The dependent variable NEGATIVE CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN, NCAR[-10,+10]
equals -CAR[-10,+10], where day [0] refers to a default date, namely the loan default date or the bond default
date of the same company. The CARs are computed based on market-model adjustment, i.e., the return
based on a market-model regression (using a market index such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index for
loans and the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index for bonds) is subtracted from the
loan or bond daily return. The independent variables are as follows: LOAN DUMMY takes a value of one if
it is a loan, and zero otherwise. LN(MATURITY) stands for natural log of one plus remaining maturity (in
years) as on a default date. LN(AMOUNT) stands for natural log of one plus amount of the loan or bond
issue (in $ millions). SENIOR SECURED, SENIOR UNSECURED, and SENIOR SUBORDINATED each
take a value of one if a loan or bond is classiﬁed like-wise and zero otherwise. LOAN DUMMY x LOAN
DEFAULT LEADS is an interactive dummy variable that takes a value of one if it is a loan and if the loan
default date is not preceded by a bond default date for the same loan-bond pair, and zero otherwise. The
t ratios shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) variance-covariance
matrix (a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test).
Dependent Variable: -CAR[-10,+10], Market-model adjusted (%)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
INTERCEPT 33.73 -67.71 78.10 -45.35 -40.71
(3.61)a (-1.89)c (5.11)a (-1.16) (-1.01)
LOAN DUMMY -13.73 -6.38 -34.47 -27.27 -23.05
(-1.38) (-0.69) (−2.85)a (-2.33)b (-1.74)c
LN(MATURITY) 14.39 16.44 18.06
(1.49) (1.70)c (1.74)c
LN(AMOUNT) 12.19 14.52 13.64
(2.70)a (2.73)a (2.44)b
SENIOR SECURED -91.06 -93.64 -95.81
(-5.38)a (-5.44)a (-5.40)a
SENIOR UNSECURED -47.90 -32.69 -35.78
(-4.13)a (-2.55)b (-2.45)b
SENIOR SUBORDINATED -31.99 -25.44 -29.45
(-2.72)a (-1.66)c (-1.66)c
LOAN DUMMY x
LOAN DEFAULT LEADS -10.39
(-1.24)
Observations 138 138 138 138 138
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.19 0.19
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TABLE 5
Linear regression of negative cumulative abnormal returns around default dates
This table presents OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations determining the cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) performance of loans and bonds surrounding default dates. This table includes loans, and bonds
where we are able to compute the CAR based on the market-model adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event
window. The dependent variable NEGATIVE CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN, NCAR[-10,+10]
equals -CAR[-10,+10], where day [0] refers to a default date, namely the loan default date or the bond
default date of the same company. The CARs are computed based on market-model adjustment, i.e., the
return based on a market-model regression (using a market index such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan
Index for loans and the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index for bonds) is subtracted
from the loan or bond daily return. The independent variables are as follows: LOAN DEFAULT DUMMY
takes a value of one if it is a loan default, and zero otherwise. LOAN DUMMY takes a value of one if it
is a loan, and zero otherwise. LN(MATURITY) stands for natural log of one plus remaining maturity (in
years) as on a default date. LN(AMOUNT) stands for natural log of one plus amount of the loan or bond
issue (in $ millions). SENIOR SECURED, SENIOR UNSECURED, and SENIOR SUBORDINATED each
take a value of one if a loan or bond is classiﬁed like-wise and zero otherwise. LOAN DUMMY x LOAN
DEFAULT LEADS is an interactive dummy variable that takes a value of one if it is a loan and if the loan
default date is not preceded by a bond default date for the same loan-bond pair, and zero otherwise. The
t ratios shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) variance-covariance
matrix (a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test).
Dependent Variable: -CAR[-10,+10], Market-model adjusted (%)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
INTERCEPT 37.39 -48.02 78.01 -43.38 -36.18
(5.15)a (-2.31)b (7.08)a (-1.85)c (-1.48)
LOAN DEFAULT DUMMY 6.60 11.80 12.39 15.77 19.09
(1.06) (1.85)c (2.12)b (2.80)a (3.16)a
LOAN DUMMY -21.06 -11.17 -38.18 -30.92 -22.22
(-3.40)a (-2.13)b (−5.46)a (-5.19)a (-2.97)a
LN(MATURITY) 19.48 20.38 20.65
(3.30)a (4.26)a (4.53)a
LN(AMOUNT) 7.67 13.13 12.19
(2.39)b (4.10)a (3.65)a
SENIOR SECURED -96.74 -101.75 -105.03
(-8.42)a (-8.91)a (-9.20)a
SENIOR UNSECURED -43.99 -29.41 -30.06
(-6.37)a (-3.98)a (-4.01)a
SENIOR SUBORDINATED -27.78 -22.60 -28.15
(-3.16)a (-2.45)b (-2.80)a
LOAN DUMMY x
LOAN DEFAULT LEADS -17.07
(-3.13)a
Observations 286 286 286 286 286
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.07 0.26 0.31 0.31
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TABLE 6
Robustness tests for alternative explanations of price declines around loan default dates
This table presents robustness tests for alternative explanations of price declines around loan default dates.
See TABLE 4 Model 5 for the regression speciﬁcation and deﬁnitions of variables. Additional variables used
in this table are: RECOVERY RATE refers to the amount an investor expects from her investment in the
loan or the bond subsequent to the default date, and is proxied by the price of the loan or the bond on the loan
default date. SCALED FREQUENCY OF PRICE CHANGES refers to the number of non-zero daily return
observations as a fraction of the number of daily return observations during the estimation period [-244,-11],
further scaled by the standard deviation of daily returns during the same period. COVENANT SCORE is
the sum of four dummy variables that represent four loan/bond covenants as described in Smith and Warner
(1979), namely, INVCOV = 1 for restrictions on investments, DIVCOV = 1 for restrictions on dividends,
FINCOV = 1 for restrictions of ﬁnancing, and PAYCOV = 1 for covenants modifying payoﬀ to investors. The
t ratios shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) variance-covariance
matrix (a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test).
Dependent Variable: -CAR[-10,+10], Market-model adjusted (%)
Recovery Liquidity Covenant Timing of All
rates diﬀerences diﬀerences defaults (Models 1-4)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
INTERCEPT 66.88 -13.58 -13.36 -6.98 60.46
(2.64)a (-0.48) (-0.51) (-0.26) (2.71)a
LOAN DUMMY -8.96 -24.03 -17.99 -19.01 -25.25
(-2.24)b (-2.52)b (−2.19)b (-2.35)b (-3.91)a
LN(MATURITY) 6.17 26.84 26.49 26.36 0.12
(1.79)c (4.29)a (4.19)a (4.21)a (0.03)
LN(AMOUNT) 5.12 9.92 8.37 8.52 9.56
(1.48) (2.48)b (2.29)a (2.38)b (2.59)a
SENIOR SECURED -105.85 -115.38 -115.96 -111.62 -125.30
(-7.50)a (-7.87)a (-7.70)a (-7.97)a (-8.48)a
SENIOR UNSECURED 3.63 -32.63 -25.46 -23.22 -29.00
(0.30) (-3.23)a (-2.90)a (-2.82)a (-2.31)b
SENIOR SUBORDINATED -2.01 -27.09 -27.57 -24.16 -9.98
(-0.16) (-2.31)b (-2.16)b (-2.06)b (-0.92)
LOAN DUMMY x
LOAN DEFAULT LEADS -10.80 -24.81 -23.05 -24.46 -4.90
(-1.43) (-3.19)a (-3.12)a (-3.25)a (-0.66)
RECOVERY RATE -1.04 -1.47
(-4.07)a (-5.24)a
SCALED FREQUENCY
OF PRICE CHANGES 0.09 0.41
(2.04)b (4.30)a
COVENANT SCORE (0-4) 3.13 4.00
(1.59) (2.38)b
Observations 148 148 148 148 148
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.65
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TABLE 7
Average cumulative abnormal returns of matched loan-bond pairs with the same loan and
bond default days (matched by borrower name)
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of matched loan-bond pairs (based on
the name of the borrower) with the same loan and bond default days (i.e., within 2 days of each other)
surrounding a default date (day 0), namely a loan default date or a bond default date of the same company.
Panel A includes matched loan-bond pairs where we are able to compute the unadjusted cumulative returns
for the [-10,+10] event window. That is, the unadjusted loan or bond daily return respectively. Panel
B includes matched loan-bond pairs where we are able to compute the CAR based on the market-model
adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event window. That is, the return based on a market-model regression
using a market index (such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index for loans, or the Lehman Brothers U.S.
Corporate Intermediate Bond Index for bonds) is subtracted from the loan or bond daily return respectively.
The Z statistics of ACARs (shown in parentheses) are computed using the methodology of Brown and Warner
(1985) that considers both the time-series and cross-sectional dependence in returns. The Z statistics for
the diﬀerence in ACARs are based on a paired diﬀerence test of CARs of matched loan-bond pairs, and
are shown in parentheses, where a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a
two-tailed test.
Panel A: Unadjusted returns
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -3.04 -2.56 -0.48
(-1.28) (-0.42) (-0.17)
[-5,+5 ] -20.51 -69.87 49.36
(-4.50)a (-6.03)a (4.32)a
[-10,+10 ] -51.25 -82.90 31.65
(-8.15)a (-5.17)a (1.81)c
Obs 26 26
Panel B: Market-model adjusted returns
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(-0.57) (-0.06) (-0.34)
[-5,+5 ] -14.66 -60.66 46.00
(-3.30)a (-5.22)a (4.06)a
[-10,+10 ] -41.89 -64.96 23.07
(-6.82)a (-4.04)a (1.31)
Obs 26 26
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TABLE 8
Average cumulative abnormal returns of matched loan-bond pairs around default dates
(matched by borrower name)
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of matched loan-bond pairs (based on
the name of the borrower) surrounding a default date (day 0), namely a loan default date or a bond default
date of the same company. This table includes matched loan-bond pairs where we are able to compute the
CAR based on the market-model adjusted method for the [-60,+10] event window. That is, the return based
on a market-model regression during [-244,-61] using a market index (such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan
Index for loans, or the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index for bonds) is subtracted
from the loan or bond daily return respectively. The Z statistics of ACARs (shown in parentheses) are
computed using the methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) that considers both the time-series and
cross-sectional dependence in returns. The Z statistics for the diﬀerence in ACARs are based on a paired
diﬀerence test of CARs of matched loan-bond pairs, and are shown in parentheses, where a, b, and c stand
for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test.
Panel A: Loan default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-20,+10 ] -20.04 -63.55 43.51
(-30.87)a (-17.66)a (7.30)a
[-40,+10 ] -26.30 -76.66 50.36
(-31.60)a (-16.61)a (5.97)a
[-60,+10 ] -29.98 -85.50 55.52
(-30.52)a (-15.70)a (5.50)a
Obs 55 55
Panel B: Bond default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5)
[-20,+10 ] -17.90 -46.95 29.05
(-18.37)a (-7.07)a (3.37)a
[-40,+10 ] -25.68 -65.56 39.88
(-20.55)a (-7.70)a (3.62)a
[-10,+10 ] -30.92 -66.28 35.36
(-20.97)a (-6.59)a (2.93)a
Obs 49 49
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TABLE 9
Average cumulative abnormal returns of matched loan-stock pairs around default dates
(matched by borrower name)
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of matched loan-stock pairs surrounding
a default date (day 0), namely a loan default date or a bond default date of the same company. This
table includes matched loan-stock pairs where we are able to compute the CAR based on the market-
model adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event window. That is, the return based on a market-model
regression (using a market index such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index for loans, or a value-weighted
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX index for stocks) is subtracted from the loan or stock daily return respectively. The
number of observations is shown for the estimation window [-10,+10]. The t ratios of ACARs are computed
using the methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) that considers both the time-series and cross-sectional
dependence in returns. The t ratios for diﬀerences are based on pair-wise diﬀerence in the ACARs of matched
loan-stock pairs. The t ratios are shown in parentheses, where a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test.
Panel A: Loan default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Stock ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] 0.21 -30.77 30.98
(0.17) (-5.63)a (3.62)a
[-5,+5 ] -4.87 -32.84 27.97
(-2.08)a (-3.14)a (2.94)a
[-10,+10 ] -13.16 -52.14 38.98
(-4.93)a (-4.04)a (5.08)a
Obs 29 29
Panel B: Bond default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Stock ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5)
[-1,+1 ] -0.38 -17.27 16.89
(-0.76) (-5.40)a (3.87)a
[-5,+5 ] -4.30 -25.39 21.09
(-4.48)a (-4.14)a (4.57)a
[-10,+10 ] -6.38 -44.57 38.19
(-4.76)a (-5.28)a (1.47)
Obs 59 59
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Appendix 1
Datasets used in this study
This appendix outlines a brief overview of the datasets that we use in this study. We list the providers of
this data, and how the data was processed into individual datasets used in this study.
Loan price dataset
The source for this data is the Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) and Loan Pricing
Corporation (LPC) mark-to-market pricing service, an independent and objective pricing service to more
than 100 institutions, managing almost 175 portfolios with over $200 billion in bank loan assets. This unique
dataset consists of daily bid and ask price quotes aggregated across dealers. Each loan has a minimum of
at least two dealer quotes and a maximum of over 30 dealers, including all top broker-dealers. At the time
we received the dataset from LSTA, there were 33 dealers providing quotes to the LSTA/LPC mark-to-
market pricing service. These price quotes are obtained on a daily basis by LSTA in the late afternoon
from the dealers and the price quotes reﬂect the market events for the day. The data items in this database
include a unique loan identiﬁcation number (LIN), name of the issuer (Company), type of loan, e.g., term
loan (facility), date of pricing (Pricing Date), average of bid quotes (Avg Bid), number of bid quotes (Bid
Quotes), average of second and third highest bid quote (High Bid Avg), average of ask quotes (Avg Ask),
number of ask quotes (Ask Quotes), average of second and third lowest ask quotes (Low Ask Avg), and a
type of classiﬁcation based on the number of quotes received, e.g., Class II if 3 or more bid quotes.
The daily data from 11/1999 thru 06/2002 in the form of individual excel spreadsheets were combined
in SAS based on the unique loan identiﬁcation number (LIN). We excluded loans with a missing LIN since
there is no unique way of combining them, e.g., if a company has three loans, and the LIN is missing on two
of them. We have 543,526 loan-day observations in our loan price data spanning 1,863 loans.
Bond price (Yield Book) dataset
We extracted daily bond prices for the companies for which we have loans in the loan price dataset in
the following manner: First, we found all the available matching Yield Book IDs from the Fixed Income
Securities Database (FISD), namely the 9-digit identiﬁers comprising a 6 digit issuer cusip plus a 3 digit issue
cusip for the bonds pertaining to the companies in the loan price dataset. The matching was done manually
to ensure that we do not miss any bonds due to errors, such as an abbreviated company name in one database
and its full name in another database. Second, we extracted daily prices of the bonds from the Salomon Yield
Book based on their 9-digit identiﬁers. We have a total of 371,797 bond-day observations spanning 816 bonds.
Bond price (Datastream) dataset
We extracted daily bond prices for a subset of loans in the loan price dataset with a loan default date
or a bond default date (the primary focus of this study) in the following manner: First, we found all the
available matching Datastream IDs, namely the 6 digit Datastream codes for the bonds pertaining to the
companies in the loan price dataset. The matching was done manually to ensure that we do not miss any
bonds due to errors, such as an abbreviated company name in one database and its full name in another
database. We check both the current list of Datastream codes of live bonds and the list on the Datastream
Extranet which contains the dead bonds. Second, we extracted daily prices of the bonds from Datastream
based on their 6-digit identiﬁers. We have a total of 91,760 bond-day observations spanning 248 bonds.
Stock price dataset
We extracted daily stock prices and returns for the companies for which we have loans in the loan price
dataset in the following manner: First, we found all the available matching permnos for the stocks pertaining
to the companies in the loan price dataset. The matching was done manually to ensure that we do not miss
any stocks due to errors, such as an abbreviated company name in one database and its full name in another
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database, extra characters in one database as compared to the other. If we could still not ﬁnd a match, we
checked on Hoovers Online, Mergent Online and ﬁnally on Google. If the company is a subsidiary of a larger
company we used the parent companys permno. Second, we extracted daily prices and stocks from the 2002
CRSP stock ﬁles based on the permnos. We have a total of 21,510 stock-day observations spanning 75 stocks
corresponding to a subset of loans in the loan price dataset with a loan default date or a bond default date
(the primary focus of this study).
Loan defaults dataset
The loan defaults dataset consists of loan defaults from the institutional loans market. We received this
data from Portfolio Management Data (PMD), a business unit of Standard & Poors (recently changed its
name to “Standard & Poor’s Leveraged Commentary & Data”) which has been tracking loan defaults in the
institutional loans market since 1995. During our sample period we had 90 loan defaults.
Bond defaults dataset
The source for our bond defaults dataset is the “New York University (NYU) Salomon Center’s Altman
Bond Default Database”. It is a comprehensive dataset of domestic corporate bond default dates starting
from 1974. During our sample period we had 765 bond defaults pertaining to 366 companies.
Loan characteristics dataset
The source for our loan characteristics dataset is the Loan Pricing Corporation. The key data items are:
(a) Name of the borrower, (b) Facility type: information on seniority of a facility, and whether it is a term
loan or revolver facility, (c) Facility amount, (d) Facility date, (e) Final maturity, (f) Security, e.g., Secured
or Unsecured or what type of speciﬁc collateral (All assets, or Capital Stock of Operating Units etc.), (g)
Loan Identiﬁcation Number. We ﬁrst matched the details of the loan from the loan price dataset, e.g., LIN,
name of the borrower, and we created variables that denote the priority structure of a loan, e.g., SENIOR
SECURED, SENIOR UNSECURED, and SENIOR SUBORDINATED (see Section 4.2.2.) based on Facility
type and Security information.
Bond characteristics dataset
The source for our bond defaults dataset is the “New York University (NYU) Salomon Center’s Altman
Bond Default Database”. To measure the priority structure of bonds, we incorporate the seniority and col-
lateral information of a bond, using the classiﬁcation of Altman and Kishore (1996). We classify bonds into
four diﬀerent categories based on the description of a bond in the bond defaults dataset: (a) Senior secured,
(b) Senior unsecured, (c) Senior subordinated, and (d) Subordinated and others.
Indices dataset
The sources for the indices dataset is the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index from the Standard &
Poor’s, the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index from the Datastream, and the
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Value-weighted Index from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP)
for the loan, bond and stock index returns. While the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond
Index and the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Value-weighted Index are both daily series, the S&P/LSTA Lever-
aged Loan Index is a weekly series during our sample period. We converted the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan
Index weekly series to a daily series through linear intrapolation wherever necessary.
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Appendix 2
Average cumulative abnormal returns of matched loan-bond pairs
(matched by borrower name)
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of matched loan-bond pairs (based on
the name of the borrower) surrounding a default date (day 0), namely a loan default date or a bond default
date of the same company. This table includes matched loan-bond pairs where we are able to compute
the CAR for the [-10,+10] event window. Panel A is based on unadjusted returns, Panel B is based on
mean-adjusted returns, Panel C is based on market-adjusted returns, Panel D is based on a three-factor
model (with the three factors between a loan index return, a bond index return, and a stock index return),
and Panel E is based on the Fama-French three-factor model (see Section 4.2.1 for details). The Z statistics
of ACARs (shown in parentheses) are computed using the methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) that
considers both the time-series and cross-sectional dependence in returns. The Z statistics for the diﬀerence
in ACARs are based on a paired diﬀerence test of CARs of matched loan-bond pairs, and are shown in
parentheses, where a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test.
Panel A1: Unadjusted ACARs surrounding loan default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -4.86 -21.94 17.08
(-5.32)a (-9.51)a (7.90)a
[-5,+5 ] -12.61 -42.25 29.64
(-7.21)a (-9.56)a (6.73)a
[-10,+10 ] -23.92 -55.38 31.46
(-9.91)a (-9.07)a (5.14)a
Obs 74 74
Panel A2: Unadjusted ACARs surrounding bond default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5)
[-1,+1 ] -4.29 -7.05 2.76
(-4.31)a (-2.72)a (1.09)
[-5,+5 ] -16.23 -35.18 18.95
(-8.52)a (-7.10)a (3.55)a
[-10,+10 ] -25.55 -45.96 20.41
(-9.71)a (-6.71)a (2.58)a
Obs 69 69
Panel B1: Mean-adjusted ACARs surrounding loan default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -4.54 -20.83 16.29
(-4.99)a (-9.06)a (7.28)a
[-5,+5 ] -11.44 -38.18 26.74
(-6.56)a (-8.67)a (6.14)a
[-10,+10 ] -21.70 -47.62 25.92
(-9.00)a (-7.83)a (4.01)a
Obs 74 74
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Panel B2: Mean-adjusted ACARs surrounding bond default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5)
[-1,+1 ] -3.88 -5.32 1.44
(-3.91)a (-2.06)b (0.58)
[-5,+5 ] -14.72 -28.83 14.11
(-7.75)a (-5.82)a (2.67)a
[-10,+10 ] -22.67 -33.83 11.16
(-8.64)a (-4.94)a (1.37)
Obs 69 69
Panel C1: Market-adjusted ACARs surrounding loan default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -4.76 -22.21 17.45
(-5.19)a (-9.42)a (8.14)a
[-5,+5 ] -12.26 -42.79 30.53
(-7.00)a (-9.48)a (6.88)a
[-10,+10 ] -23.78 -56.34 32.56
(-9.82)a (-9.03)a (5.28)a
Obs 74 74
Panel C2: Market-adjusted ACARs surrounding bond default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5)
[-1,+1 ] -4.29 -7.37 3.08
(-4.34)a (-2.84)a (1.21)
[-5,+5 ] -16.24 -36.11 19.87
(-8.57)a (-7.27)a (3.72)a
[-10,+10 ] -25.63 -47.31 21.68
(-9.79)a (-6.89)a (2.72)a
Obs 69 69
Panel D1: Three-factor model ACARs surrounding loan default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -4.18 -21.52 17.34
(-4.80)a (-9.39)a (8.13)a
[-5,+5 ] -9.10 -38.62 29.52
(-5.46)a (-8.80)a (6.57)a
[-10,+10 ] -18.24 -47.50 29.26
(-7.92)a (-7.83)a (4.53)a
Obs 74 74
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Panel D2: Three-factor model ACARs surrounding bond default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5)
[-1,+1 ] -3.49 -5.58 2.09
(-3.73)a (-2.17)b (0.83)
[-5,+5 ] -12.19 -29.05 16.86
(-6.80)a (-5.91)a (2.99)a
[-10,+10 ] -18.61 -34.07 15.46
(-7.51)a (-5.02)a (1.79)c
Obs 69 69
Panel E1: Fama-French three-factor model ACARs surrounding loan default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -4.57 -21.09 16.52
(-4.99)a (-9.14)a (7.56)a
[-5,+5 ] -11.42 -38.39 26.97
(-6.51)a (-8.69)a (5.99)a
[-10,+10 ] -21.58 -47.16 25.58
(-8.91)a (-7.73)a (3.90)a
Obs 74 74
Panel E2: Fama-French three-factor model ACARs surrounding bond default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5)
[-1,+1 ] -3.98 -5.74 1.76
(-4.04)a (-2.21)b (0.70)
[-5,+5 ] -14.64 -28.09 13.45
(-7.75)a (-5.65)a (2.54)b
[-10,+10 ] -22.46 -34.11 11.65
(-8.61)a (-4.97)a (1.41)
Obs 69 69
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Appendix 3
Recovery rates by debt type and seniority
This table summarizes three measures of recovery rates, namely trading prices just after default, and 30 days
after default, and at ultimate recovery for the 1988-2Q 2003. The sources are: Altman-NYU Salomon Center
Default database, prices from numerous broker dealers in distressed debt. Bank Loan data from 1996-2002
(for the ﬁrst two measures), and Standard & Poor’s LossStatsTM database from 1988-2Q-2003 for the third
measure (ultimate recoveries discounted at each instrument’s pre-default interest rate). Note that the Sub.
Discounted Bonds category includes zero coupon and discounted bonds of all seniorities.
Debt Type/Seniority Price at Price 30 Days Ultimate recovery
Default After Default Nominal Discounted Annual
#obs. Mean % #obs. Mean % #obs. Mean % Mean % IRR %
Bank Loans 262 69.2 750 58.0 750 88.9 78.8 20.0
Senior Secured Bonds 152 51.6 222 48.8 222 76.5 65.1 20.5
Senior Unsecured Bonds 752 32.4 419 30.3 419 54.9 46.4 23.0
Senior Subordinated Bonds 346 28.8 350 28.4 350 38.2 31.6 7.7
Subordinated Bonds 180 29.0 293 28.9 343 36.3 29.4 8.9
Sub. Discounted Bonds 130 20.4 − − 43 − 22.0 −
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